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ABSTRACT  The article explores the relationship of multiculturalism to social 
solidarity. The multicultural nature of Britain is accepted as a welcome reality but 
certain problems in relation to the development of multiculturalism in Britain are 
acknowledged. Various approaches to buttress or replace multiculturalism are 
reviewed. These are: a strengthened and/or reconstituted nationalism (‘Britishness’); 
human rights; and social equality. The issue of citizenship recurs throughout. It is 
argued that a combined emphasis on human rights and greater social equality offer a 
better basis than nationalism for strengthening solidarity in Britain, especially in the 
longer term. Sociological theory offers a fruitful if strangely neglected starting point 
for understanding social solidarity. I draw critically on Durkheim and Marx to obtain 
some objective perspective on this controversial matter. 
 





The intensification of the debate about British identity reflects fears that British 
society is becoming more fragmented along ethnic and religious lines with possible 
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consequences of disorder and dysfunction. These fears have increased since the 
London bombings of July 2005 and the alleged conspiracy of August 2006 to blow up 
ten planes: the former providing Britain’s parallel to the United State’s iconic 9/11. 
Terrorism is the perceived immediate threat but some see multicultural policy as an 
underlying factor eroding a sense of national unity. Trevor Phillips gave several 
influential speeches to this effect following 7/7 (2005(a)); (2005(b)).  A tendency for 
ethnic and religious identities to overlap in Britain has sharpened the lines of possible 
conflict.    
 
Responses to the alleged crisis of multiculturalism in Britain include: advocacy of a 
strengthened nationalism; unity through shared citizenship; reassertion of some form 
of multiculturalism; and greater emphasis on human rights as a broad basis of 
identification for the citizens of a diverse society. These ‘solutions’ are not mutually 
exclusive and often the debate is about how best to balance all or some of these 
factors. Thus David Goodhart combines an emphasis on nationalism with citizenship 
and is critical of both multicultural and human rights as bases of social cohesion 
(2004; 2005; 2006). Despite the complexity of some contributions, the debate has 
tended to become polarised around the respective claims of multiculturalism and a 
revitalised British identity. At one extreme some see multiculturalism as the source of 
many of Britain’s current discontents whilst others condemn any notion of 
‘Britishness’ as reactionary and imperialistic (Note 1). There are more productive 
ways of framing the debate than this. The underlying issue is social solidarity and 
how to foster it. Focusing on national identity as a counterbalance to multiculturalism 
is merely one approach and could be counter-productive if pursued insensitively.   
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Below I review the relationship of multiculturalism to the following: ‘Britishness’; 
human rights; and social equality. Citizens’ rights recur as an issue throughout. 
Equality is a theme of both citizens’ and human rights but also has a distinct 
provenance via the socialist/social democratic tradition. My argument is that a 
combination of human rights and social equality offer a better basis than nationalism 
for strengthening social solidarity in Britain, especially in the longer term. These 
universal perspectives also offer a better basis than nationalism for a critique of 
multiculturalism. Sociological theory offers a fruitful starting point for understanding 
social solidarity and I draw critically on Durkheim and Marx to gain some objective 
perspective on this fraught matter. 
 
The controversial nature of this issue requires that I clarify my own perspective. First, 
it is clear that Britain is a multicultural society and in any conceivable scenario is 
likely to remain one. To reverse this would require policies little short of Fascism. 
Second, it follows that even if multiculturalism has in some ways ‘gone wrong’, it 
cannot be abolished but should be reshaped through policy and/or informal social 
interaction. The policy-shift (back) towards integration advocated by Trevor Phillips 
cannot fundamentally change the fact that Britain is a multicultural society though it 
may encourage exploration of areas of cultural commonality. Third, my own 
commitment is to a multicultural rather than a monocultural Britain. I see this as 
complementary to human rights and greater social equality. 
 
The case made below that human rights are a particularly powerful means of 
contributing to social solidarity in a diverse society is predominantly theoretical but 
practical and empirical arguments are also cited. Not that theory per se needs 
 5
defending but some critics of the human rights project, particularly nationalists, 
sometimes characterise its supporters as impractical romantics and themselves as 
realists. Thus, Skrbis, Kendall and Woodward mock the ‘impotence’ of Beck’s 
cosmopolitan vision in which universal human rights prominently figure (Skrbis et al., 
2004: 118). In fact, attempts to extrapolate the pattern of the future from the present 
have a distinguished pedigree in social science. Beck’s work on global risks and the 
necessary collective response is firmly within this tradition – and is highly realistic 
(2006 (2004)).      
 
Several points of terminology need to be made. The debate under discussion is about 
‘Britishness’ rather than ‘Englishness’ and accordingly I use the former term. 
Britishness is an example of nationalism but there is a problem of appropriate usage 
of the latter term. Nationalism is a broad-spectrum ideology ranging from Fascism to 
a moderate identification with a given country with no necessary negative 
assumptions about other nations. These variations are indicated below as necessary. I 
use the term ‘solidarity’ rather than ‘integration’ as the appropriate term to indicate 
social cohesion and order. Integrationist policies can contribute to solidarity but so 
can other policies and processes discussed below. Finally, several of the many 
meanings of the term equality are used. I adopt the human rights assumption that 
human beings are equal in their humanity. References are also made to socialist and 
liberal approaches to equality, the former stressing greater material equality and 
equality of cultural access and the latter greater equality of opportunity. I use the 
qualification ‘greater’ to indicate that, as far as I am concerned, there is no necessary 
assumption of absolute equality in either ideological account of equality.    
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Durkheim and Marx: Social Solidarity 
  
In The Division of Labour in Society, Durkheim stipulated two kinds of social 
solidarity: mechanical and organic (Durkheim 1964 (1893)). The former is based on 
members’ unity of beliefs and values, often religious, and the latter on practical 
interdependence resulting from the modern, complex division of labour. While these 
concepts remain a useful starting point for analysing social solidarity, the social 
context to which Durkheim applied them has greatly changed and they require review 
and buttressing from contemporary social science.  
 
Adopting a broadly social evolutionary perspective, Durkheim assumed that as 
modern socio-economic forms came to predominate, the incidence of mechanical 
solidarity would decline and organic solidarity would increase. He argued that the 
values underpinning modern societies were rational and secular rather than religious. 
Until about twenty years ago, many observers would have agreed with his following 
remark but it now seems spectacularly mistaken: 
 
If there is one truth that history has settled beyond all question, it is that religion 
embraces an ever diminishing part of social life (Durkheim in Thompson ed., 1985: 
49). 
 
In fact, the solidarity of many predominantly Islamic nations is substantially based on 
a high degree of religious unity and is also arguably a significant factor in that of 
some other societies, including the United States. Equally religious divisions within 
otherwise modern societies can undermine organic solidarity. This has been the case 
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in Northern Ireland and arguably the growth of religious diversity in the rest of Britain 
during the post second-world-war period is divisive and may become more so. 
 
Whereas mechanical solidarity has persisted beyond Durkheim’s expectation, organic 
solidarity has proved more fragile than he perhaps expected – although he did 
stipulate demanding conditions for its effective functioning (see below: 8). 
Durkheim’s model of a modern society assumed largely autonomous nation states 
within which economic activity was effectively regulated by the state (the role of the 
state in maintaining a ‘normal’ division of labour is extensively discussed in Book 
Three of The Division of Labour in Society). Globalisation weakens this model by 
reducing the degree to which the borders of modern nation states circumscribe 
relatively discrete societies. Appadurai (1996) and Urry (2000; 2003) have illustrated 
the extent to which global flows of information, images, objects and people have 
opened up formerly relatively homogeneous and autonomous societies to powerful 
and potentially disruptive external economic, social and political forces. 
 
Durkheim scarcely addressed the effects of the international economic and political 
forces on organic solidarity. Indeed, as Ken Thompson points out, he did not even 
think it worth speculating much about the possibility of a politically unified Europe, 
let alone world government (2002:154). Specifically, he did not consider the effect on 
organic solidarity of the relocation of substantial domestic production abroad and/or 
the use of im/migrant labour. Globalisation has greatly accelerated these 
developments, including their disruptive consequences. It is Marx rather than 
Durkheim who offers foresight on these matters.  
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Marx analyses the division of labour in terms of capitalism rather than modernity. He 
differs from Durkheim in regarding the capitalist division of labour as fundamentally 
divisive and as generating a deep fault-line in capitalist society (Marx in Bottomore 
and Rubel (ed.), 1967: 153-8). Unlike Durkheim, Marx analysed the international 
dimension of the division of labour, arguing that capital adapts the division of labour 
to suit its own purposes (mainly profit) with limited or no concern for the effect on 
social stability. He fully theorised the global or, as he put it, ‘imperialist’ dimension 
and momentum of capitalism (Marx in Bottomore and Rubel (ed.), 1967: 145-8). 
More recently, Lash and Urry use the phrase ‘disorganised capitalism’ to describe the 
prevailing character of the ‘free’ market that followed the more regulated version 
(1987).  
 
Durkheim emphasised the growth of individual diversity in modern societies but 
made little reference to the consequences of increased ethnic group diversity or to the 
possible associated allegiances of various ethnic groups to external entities, including 
religious and political. Recently, ethnic and cultural conflict has been more apparent 
than conflict directly caused by the mobility of capital and labour but the latter have 
an underlying influence on the former. Global or international labour has been so 
weakened in relation to global capital that its protests have been subdued and its 
arguments muted. However, as both Marx and Durkheim appreciated such class 
inequality is not a sound long-term basis for social solidarity. Marx’s views in this 
respect require no elaboration. While Durkheim accepted class hierarchy he was a 
radical meritocrat arguing that organic solidarity could not function ‘normally’ 
without genuine equality of opportunity (1964: 374-388).  This led him to advocate a 
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number of egalitarian positions including opposition to inherited wealth (1957: 210-
11). 
   
Marx’s critique of nationalism as an ideology that divides the working class has been 
extended by some contemporary Marxists and critics of the left to apply to what they 
see as the ineffective and potentially divisive effects of multiculturalism (Mullard in 
Tierney ed., 1982; Solomos, 2003: 209-201). They mainly focus on national and 
ethnic division among the proletariat although in principle such division can affect all 
classes. They argue that the conflicts of capitalist society, including ethnic or racial 
ones, cannot be fully or systemically understood or resolved at the cultural level but 
require addressing in terms of the political-economy of capitalism, particularly its 
tendency to produce extreme inequalities (see also Miles, 2003: 130-6; 148-150). 
Marxist theory offers a radical interpretation of racial and ethnic conflict which 
locates nationalism and frequently multiculturalism as exacerbating factors. To the 
extent that this perspective has merit, it is questionable whether either nationalist or 
multicultural policies alone or in combination can adequately solve ethnic conflict and 
cultural fragmentation.  
 
To emphasise the role of economic factors in explaining Britain’s, and by implication 
Western Europe’s current ethnic conflicts, does not imply that cultural factors are 
unimportant or without ‘relatively autonomous’ effect. The Rushdie ‘affair’ 
emphatically demonstrated the contrary as did the world-wide protests in early 2006 
against the cartoons of the Prophet. Huntingdon’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis is too 
narrowly cultural, nevertheless there is immense potential for conflict between the 
values and practices of Islam and Western liberalism (Huntington, 1996).     
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In summary, whereas Durkheim regards the ‘modern division of labour’ as socially 
unifying (in its ‘normal’ form), Marx and Marxists see ‘the capitalist division of 
labour’ as fundamentally divisive. The systematic thinking of these two classic 
thinkers can illuminate the multiculturalism/British identity debate and similar 
debates across Europe. In particular, both consider that solidarity requires greater 
equality than occurs in contemporary capitalist societies.  
 
Multiculturalism and Social Solidarity 
 
Criticisms of multiculturalism preceded 9/11 but have since become more 
widespread. Prior to 9/11 the debate in North America and Britain largely focused on 
the respective merits of multiculturalism/cultural relativism versus human 
rights/universalism (see Barry: 2001; Kelly ed.: 2002). After 9/11 and in Britain, 
particularly after 7/7 the emphasis of the debate shifted to multiculturalism versus 
national identity. Some adopted compromise positions in these debates although the 
overall tone was quite partisan. The post 7/7 debate was initially conducted mainly 
through the daily and weekly media where contributions tended to be short and sharp.  
 
Despite fundamental differences, both the human rights and nationalist perspectives 
typically argue that strong multiculturalism threatens social solidarity. There are two 
main aspects to this criticism. The first is that a preoccupation with multiculturalism 
obscures and devalues what people have in common. Human sameness is important as 
well as difference. In the human rights perspective the reference point for what people 
have in common is the human species whereas in the nationalist one the reference 
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point for inclusion is usually British citizenship although some versions are narrower 
seeking to exclude one or more group as being less authentically ‘British’. The media 
debate focused on integration through a revived national identity as the main antidote 
to ethnic tension and perceived segregation without adequately considering alternative 
approaches to strengthening social solidarity, including the human rights one. This 
may partly be because Trevor Phillips, the influential Chair for the Commission for 
Racial Equality, presented the terms of the debate in this way (2005(a)). 
 
A second criticism of multiculturalism is its alleged ‘political correctness’. This 
criticism is associated with the political right (Browne, 2005) but has also come from 
the left (Cummings, 2001). Political correctness is seen as bureaucratic and 
controlling, if not repressive and, at least by implication, as a threat to social 
solidarity. The minority rights reforms of the last forty years have involved 
establishing a vast framework of law and regulations with accompanying enforcement 
and monitoring mechanisms. If these are to some extent necessary to reduce prejudice 
and discrimination  – and surely they are – they also run a risk of stifling legitimate 
opinion and debate. Clearly a balance has to be struck. Where the balance weighs 
against freedom of expression people may feel inhibited and even intimidated and 
resentment can build up. This association with political correctness has contributed to 
the backlash against multiculturalism.  
 
Several writers with Muslim cultural roots have expressed the need for a more open 
cross-cultural dialogue with perhaps less inhibition than a non-Muslim might choose 
to do. For instance, Hanif Kureishi argues that ‘an effective multiculturalism’ should 
involve ‘a robust and committed exchange of ideas’ rather than ‘a superficial 
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exchange of festival and food’ (Guardian: 04.08.2005: 21). The relative lack of such 
debate until recently has a resulted in previously little discussed and even 
unrecognised issues erupting dangerously. A crucial one is the extent to which the 
Western liberal value of freedom of expression should apply to religion. Manifestly, 
there are other serious matters of cultural disagreement not only between some 
versions of Islam and Western liberalism but between aspects of certain African and 
African-Caribbean cultures and the West. There is a sense in which Muslim anger has 
caused a loss of liberal ‘innocence’ in a way that black anger never quite did. Well-
meaning words and even reform are insufficient to assuage the sense of historic 
injustice and humiliation felt across a proud culture. An honest debate is needed 
between cultures, including their historical relations. As Kureishi concludes: ‘(our) 
children deserve better than an education that comes from liberal guilt’. What they do 
deserve is a debate in which conflicting and complementary cultural values are 
thoroughly aired in a mutually civilised and tolerant manner.  If this is now beginning 
following the shock of the alleged conspiracy of August 2006, it has taken far too 
long.   
 
The effects of political correctness are not confined to the intellectual sphere. The 
politically correct ethos surrounding multiculturalism can undermine the informative 
and constructive communication required to formulate practical policy and behaviour. 
Often difficult and controversial matters affecting minority communities are ignored 
by white commentators and left to minority writers to address. The latter include 
Diane Abbott (‘black on black’ gun crime), Trevor Phillips (the educational 
performance of black boys), and Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (black racism) (see Note 2). 
It is understandable that white commentators should feel cautious about commenting 
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on sensitive ‘race’ issues. However, in a mature multicultural society in which trust is 
high, they would feel more confident to do so. Michael Cummings passionately 
argues that social scientists should in any case address these issues because avoidance 
can damage the very people whose sensitivities are supposedly being protected. He 
contends that political correctness on the left ‘unintentionally undermines progressive 
causes’ (2001: ix). I argue below that it is not merely ‘progressive causes’ but the 
wider ‘social equality project’ of the left – which transcends ethnic divisions – that 
has been damaged and, in fact, almost supplanted by an excessive but paradoxically 
inhibited emphasis on culture.  
 
Bhiku Parekh and Tariq Modood are among the academic contributors to the 
multicultural debate who have defended multiculturalism against recent criticism.  
Parekh’s Rethinking Multiculturalism (2000) and the Report of the Commission he 
chaired, The Future of Multi-ethnic Britain  (The Parekh Report) (2000) are regarded 
by some critics as emphasising minority rights at the expense of national identity 
(Guardian Editorial, 11.10.2000) and by others at the expense of human rights (Barry 
in Kelly, 2002: 212-17). I partly agree with the latter criticism and will return to it 
later. Parekh makes a sustained attempt to balance the merits of multiculturalism with 
those of national identity and human rights. However, my reading of the Report is that 
its communitarianism  - Britain as a ‘community of communities’ – was the acme of a 
trend in multiculturalism that had simply gone too far and was already in danger of 
losing support even before 9/11 (for a more favourable view of the Report and one 
critical of the media’s response to it, see Pilkington, 2003: 264-74). It is possible that 
the Report inadvertently set back rather than helped the cause of multiculturalism but 
in any case, 9/11 has provoked much soul-searching about the possible divisive 
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effects of multiculturalism. More recently, Tariq Modood, a notable but critical 
admirer of Parekh, has reasserted the continuing need for a ‘moderate, egalitarian 
multiculturalism’ which he sees as complementary to developing a sense of national 
belonging (2005(a): 205). Modood argues that there is a need for British Muslims to 
develop strong institutions, somewhat as British Jews have done, which interweave 
with the fabric of British public life (2005(b)). Clearly, there is a cultural dimension to 
this but his main argument is that Muslims should engage in political and civic 
pluralism. Few would disagree but such is now the degree of communal distrust that 
even what Modood terms ‘political multiculturalism’ requires to be pursued rather 
less for ethnic advantage and more to achieve consensus and conciliation. As Dench, 
Gavron and Young argue debate must effectively address the needs of the ethnic 
majority as well as minorities for fairness and equality (2006: Introduction).  
 
Nationalism and Social Solidarity 
 
In the months following the London bombings of July 2005, numerous politicians, 
journalists and academics prescribed one or other version of shared ‘British identity’ 
as antidotes to ethnic and religious tensions and conflicts. Others were emphatic that 
the history of the British Empire provides little basis for any such consensus (see Note 
1). I share this scepticism on the grounds that Britain is now so culturally diverse that 
an inclusive nationalism would be too dilute to provide a sufficient basis for social 
solidarity. Britain is now so multicultural that it is necessary to widen the basis of its 
solidarity. Human rights figured prominently in the post 7/7 debate in respect to the 
arrest and internment of alleged terrorists but not as a basis for fostering social 
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solidarity. Nor did the argument that greater social equality could enhance solidarity 
get much media coverage.   
 
David Goodhart’s promotion of ‘national citizenship’ has made an influential 
contribution the debate on national solidarity (Observer, 08,02,2004; Prospect, 2004, 
2005; 2006). Goodhart and certain other contributors to Prospect are concerned that 
Britain may have reached a point where ‘diversity’ threatens solidarity (see also 
Wolfe and Klaussen, 2000). Goodhart has recently stated his position more fully in a 
pamphlet titled Progressive Nationalism: Citizenship and the Left (2006) in which he 
give space to others to comment on his views. His main argument is that ‘civic 
nationalism’ expressed in the form of a strong welfare state offers a practical basis for 
strengthening social solidarity and that steps should be taken to ensure that access to 
full citizenship, including welfare rights, is highly prized as a basis of national 
identification. A key idea he floats is that of a two-tier citizenship. He does not 
formally define the two tiers but gives the example of temporary European workers as 
a group that might have restricted rights. ‘National citizenship’ appears to equate with 
the privileged tier of citizenship. Welfare is one of four areas where Goodhart 
believes that public policy should ‘favour solidarity’: the others are immigration and 
asylum, culture, and politics and language. 
  
There are important practical aspects of Goodhart’s argument that I partly agree with. 
A strong welfare state is one of these although, granted that access to welfare requires 
some differentiation, a two-tier system is probably not the best approach – it appears 
not to have worked very effectively in Denmark and may have contributed to the 
recent ethnic-religious tensions there. In any case, a robust welfare system should be 
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part of a broader egalitarianism, including an international dimension (see Seabrook 
below: 29). I also agree that immigration must be regulated although the preferred 
framework for dealing with issues of immigration and asylum should be European 
rather than national. As far as asylum is concerned, contrary to Goodhart’s wish to 
strengthen political control, the role of the judiciary in protecting asylum seekers’ 
human rights is crucial for justice and important for ethnic relations. Even these areas 
of partial agreement with Goodhart indicate an underlying philosophical and political 
disagreement. This is still more evident in terms of culture, politics and language. 
‘Nationalism’ is too narrow a core philosophy for multi-ethnic and globalised Britain. 
On this point I agree with Parekh that ‘the language of nationalism is deeply flawed 
and best avoided’ (Parekh in Goodhart, 2006: 76). Much of the rest of this paper 
argues or implies that nationalism is inadequate as the main basis of social solidarity. 
Goodhart’s analysis seldom extends much beyond the borders of Britain and as a 
result he misses the ‘big picture’. He betrays a conservatism at odds with his claim to 
‘progressivism’. An example of this is the conclusions he draws from a legitimate 
distinction he makes between ‘indigenous’ British residents and more recent 
immigrants and asylum seekers. He suggests that the formers historical struggle for 
democracy and its associated rights has fostered a deep-rooted identity with the nation 
state whereas recent immigrants may covet and acquire citizens’ rights without having 
developed such an identification. He further argues that competition for welfare with 
recent immigrants has caused some resentment among the ethnic majority. This 
analysis is accurate as far as it goes but it requires sensitive balancing with the needs 
and perspectives of ethnic minorities.  Goodhart offers little more than a rather 
minimal recognition that the identities of ethnic minorities must be respected and an 
indication they must also be part of a revitalised nationalism. A deeper and empathetic 
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understanding the motivations and concerns of Britain’s minorities is urgently needed 
to achieve a sounder basis of solidarity. This includes addressing human rights and 
British foreign policy. The logic of human rights is to check the drift towards ethnic 
separatism by ensuring common rights. The gradual harmonization of the rights of 
European citizens moves in this direction. 
 
A further example of Goodhart’s wary approach to diversity is his tendency to treat 
diversity almost as the opposite of solidarity. This is not quite correct and throws his 
discussion slightly out of focus. The opposite of solidarity is lack of social cohesion 
and order. Diversity may threaten cohesion and order but not necessarily. It is 
impossible to pursue the point in detail here but arguably the diversity of the United 
States contributes more than it detracts from solidarity. The United States is a 
famously argumentative and litigious society but in the longer term the democratic 
expression of diverse opinion contributes more to the nation’s solidarity than would 
its suppression. However, the inept handling of diversity, particularly disregarding its 
potentially divisive aspects, as has sometimes characterised British multicultural 
policy, can lead to social disruption. 
 
Goodhart’s suggestions are vulnerable to the Marxist critique of nationalism or, more 
precisely, ‘ethnicism’: that is it divides the proletariat along ethnic lines. From this 
perspective, nationalism and ethnicism are regarded as kindred ideologies that 
obscure the common interests of the proletariat, of whatever ethnicity, in greater 
equality. Instead the indigenous proletariat is offered an empty identification with 
‘nation’ and im/migrant labour is routinely characterised as the alien and threatening 
‘other’. The divisiveness of nationalism can extend beyond the proletariat. A ‘British’ 
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and, still more, an ‘English’, nationalism is likely to have some appeal for British 
born whites across the class structure and a relative lack of appeal to ethnic 
minorities. Of course, divisiveness is the opposite of Goodhart’s intentions but the 
risk of it is inherent in his approach. Nevertheless, unlike some multiculturalists, 
Goodhart does not fudge the real tensions between Britain’s ethnic groups despite his 
apparent prioritisation of the ethnic majority.   
 
The route to solidarity in contemporary Britain is neither through homogenised 
national identity nor hegemony of the majority. Britain is now so diverse that no one 
set of national values, institutions and symbols can provide a sufficiently unifying 
focus. The term ‘British’ itself is favoured as a self-description by few Asians 
although many accept it as part of a hyphenated identity (Guardian/ICM Survey, 
2002) and according to Tariq Modood, over a quarter of British born African-
Caribbeans do not think of themselves as British. (Modood, 2005(a): 196-9). In any 
case, as Modood also observes, ‘British’ is a declining identity even among white 
Britons (2005:196). Alternative means to sustain social solidarity must be found. It 
matters less what people believe than that they care about the society they live in. 
People are likely to care if their rights are secure and they have a decent standard of 
living. 
 
Nevertheless, within a wider strategy of rights and equality, there is scope for 
government-led cultural initiatives to strengthen social solidarity but these should be 
in the form of creating opportunity for fair and open cultural expression, dialogue and 
exchange. One move in that direction would be to for the representation of the Church 
of England in the House of Lords be replaced by a system better reflecting the 
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diversity of faith and belief in society. And it would be a unifying and dignifying 
measure if the people of Britain were formally recognised as sovereign rather than as 
subjects of the monarch. However, much, almost certainly most, cultural creativity in, 
for instance, sport, entertainment, and in some areas of the media occurs with limited 
reference to government and should be left to do so.  
 
Finally, Goodhart’s views on the contribution of human rights to solidarity are 
substantially opposed to the arguments of the next section. He criticises 
multiculturalists for typically supporting human rights laws alongside 
multiculturalism as a way of dealing with common needs and conflicts (2004 (b): 33). 
It is true that Parekh and others tend to look as much to human rights law as to 
national law for this purpose (see The Report on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: 
Chapter 7). However, Goodhart makes no mention of the central and defining debate 
between multiculturalists and human rights theorists referred to earlier. What is at 
stake in this debate is the balance between universal/human values and law and 
relative/ethnically-based ones. The difference between the two approaches is not 
merely abstract but affects such everyday matters as dress and schooling. It is 
Parekh’s tendency to favour relativist rather than universalist solutions in concrete 
instances that marks him as a robust multiculturalist. His theoretical contributions to 
the multicultural/human rights debate further reinforce this assessment (see especially 
his exchange with Barry in Kelly, 2002: Chapter 8). This debate rather than 
Goodhart’s comments reflects the notably antagonistic nature of the two positions. Of 
course, multiculturalists and human rights theorists variously take something from 
each position but crucially disagree about the primary philosophical and legal (and 
therefore practical) basis of a free society. However, Goodhart virtually conflates the 
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two positions, too easily dismissing human rights with multiculturalism. What he 
offers is a majority nationalism. Ulrich Beck’s remark that those who fail to 
appreciate the reality of globalisation tend to reiterate ineffectual ‘modern’ (‘first 
modernity’) solutions to ‘second modernity’ problems seems applicable (2006 (2004): 
68-71)). It is, then, possible to appreciate Goodhart’s concern about multiculturalism 
whilst radically disagreeing with his views on human rights.     
 
Many of Goodhart’s arguments have been made by David Miller in his impressive  
On Nationality (1995). If anything, Miller is more comprehensive in his support of 
nationalism in that Goodhart favours a specific form,  ‘progressive’ nationalism. Both 
rebuke cosmopolitan liberals for a supposed lack of realism and Goodhart adds the 
observation that the ‘notion’ of human rights is ‘ahistorical’ (2006: 6). This need not 
be the case but the nationalism is certainly not ahistorical. It has already changed 
much more fundamentally and with profounder consequences than Miller and 
Goodhart acknowledge. The identities of the British are less and less confined within 
national boundaries. Communities of identity, for some far stronger than national 
identity, straddle the world, a reality that the British government must accommodate 
to.   
 
Much of the debate reviewed in this article focuses on the relative claims of three 
different bases of community as foci of identity:  ethnicity; nationality; and 
humanity/human rights. Of course all three are valid sources of identity but none is 
static or trans-historical. It is entirely realistic, in fact, urgent to respond to rapid 
global change by bolstering human community. Nationalism and ethnic identification 
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not infrequently occur in excess and can be counterproductive and even dangerous to 
the wider human community.          
 
 
Human Rights and Social Solidarity 
 
I now turn to the positive side of my argument: that human rights and greater social 
equality are the most effective means to develop solidarity in a globalised society. In a 
sense, these two arguments are one in that rights covering basic equality, including 
material survival and education, are written into the United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights (see especially Articles 9, 22 and 25). However, more than basic 
equality would be required in modern societies to substantially enhance social 
solidarity. 
 
A brief reference to the philosophical debate about the basis of human rights will 
suffice here. Arguments range from the belief that human rights are divinely ordained 
to the view that they simply offer the best protection to human frailty (Turner and 
Rojek, 2001: Chapter 7). The latter point is powerful although human rights can also 
be conceived of positively as a framework for individual, group and species 
expression and development. However, the issue here is the potential of human rights 
as a foundation for social solidarity rather than their philosophical justification. In this 
respect, they are a frequent basis of legal appeal in cases where one ethnic group or 
certain members of it are considered to be oppressing another. Ultimately, the 
effectiveness of human rights depends on the support of a democratic global 
consensus and commitment to action. In contrast to nationalism, human rights offer 
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the possibility of a universalist justification for action. Participating more fully within 
a regional and global human rights framework could alleviate fractiousness and 
fragmentation in Britain by increasing a sense of fairness and justice. An 
appropriately framed British Bill of Rights would complement nicely the Human 
Rights Act of 1998. 
 
If globalisation has disruptive and divisive effects, it also offers through human rights 
solutions to the problems it produces. Mary Kalder makes a link between 
globalisation, civil society and human rights. She argues that ‘civil society has 
become transnational’ (2003: 48) and that ‘reason, moral sentiment and/or civil action 
… provide the basis for social solidarity’ (2003: 46-7). The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and its many derivatives provide a more inclusive foundation for 
developing social solidarity than minority or majority cultures with limited reference 
to a wider framework of values and law. Minority exceptionalism risks fragmentation 
and majority hegemony risks degenerating into an oppressive nationalism. In contrast, 
human rights, at least in principle, embrace everybody equally and are therefore the 
natural (human) basis for social solidarity.  
 
However, human rights and group rights need not be antagonistic and, in fact, the 
United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes various rights that 
imply freedom to various group and communal memberships, including political and 
religious. The diverse global origins of Britain’s recent immigrant groups mean that 
human rights are of special relevance to them. There foci of identification are in part 
different from longer-term inhabitants. If Britain and other Western states are to 
maintain the commitment of their minorities they must respect the human rights of all 
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members of the wider ethnic and/or religious communities with which their minorities 
identify - wherever and whoever they are. This includes asylum seekers, those seeking 
to avoid deportation and those accused of terrorist crimes. Otherwise, some members 
of ethnic minorities, possibly many, may distance themselves from and even reject the 
societies to which they have emigrated. Clearly, some young Muslims of both Asian 
and African descent have already done so. Many recent immigrants into Britain are 
highly transnational in their identities which is why Norman Tebbitt’s nationality test 
remains as anachronistic as ever. They identify with aspects of their countries of 
origin just as Britons moving within the country retain regional allegiances. These 
diverse, multiple and sometimes fluid identities make it unlikely that most members 
of minorities will adopt the kind of traditional British nationalism that has in the past 
contributed to a sense of ‘one nation’ and helped create a degree of solidarity. A 
further profound consequence of multiethnicity is that it is increasingly difficult and 
dangerous for a state to declare war against a country with which its minorities have 
substantial ties. To do so is perhaps a kind of civil war. The logic of global 
communities and of a nascent global community undermines nationalism. 
 
The impact of globalisation on the sources and flows of power and authority in the 
contemporary world affects solidarity. Benjamin Barber argues that the break-up of 
the European and Soviet empires has let loose a myriad of ethnonational identity 
movements, often reinforced by religion (Barber, 2003). This is happening on a global 
scale and, paradoxically globalisation contributes to it. In some cases, notably in 
Eastern Europe, these movements have dismantled polyethnic states and established 
more monoethnic new ones or revived old ones. Parallel to this and reinforced by it, 
the global movement of labour has resulted in large numbers of immigrants often 
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from areas previously subjugated by the European empires settling in Western 
Europe. In contrast to Eastern Europe, the monoethnic basis of Western European 
nations has been weakened. Concentrations of ethnic minorities have some 
resemblance to internal colonies even where residents have full formal rights of 
citizenship.  
 
A central domestic issue now facing several Western European states is how to 
reintegrate their populations. Tendencies to ethnic segregation must be balanced by 
countervailing forces if integration is to be achieved and social solidarity 
(re)established. Human rights are the most ethically compelling of these forces  – far 
more so than some fabricated version of nationalism, the content of which people 
cannot anyway agree on. However, it is important to strike a balance between 
universal rights and group, specifically ethnic and religious, rights. The metaphor of 
the pendulum is appropriate – whenever it swings further towards one or other of 
human or group rights, the pull back towards the other can be anticipated. In Britain, 
group rights - multiculturalism - have had a long momentum but this may now be 
reversing. 
 
Although Bhikhu Parekh is a noted advocate of a global dialogue on rights, he seems 
as much concerned to argue the cultural relativism of human rights as the practical 
need for their implementation (Parekh in Kelly, 2002). His writings on Britain focus 
more on the advocacy of minority rights than the development of a wider framework 
of unity. His notion of diversity inclines to the communitarian: an equality of 
communities. Despite attempts to balance the claims of minority rights, human rights 
and national identity – the latter especially more recently – his emphasis is on the 
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former. Thus, in an article opposing ‘dogma’ in higher education he gives more 
emphasis to criticising the Higher Education Minister’s insistence that universities 
prevent terrorist influences on Muslim students than to the possible effects of such 
influences (Parekh, 2006: 16). Tariq Modood has better appreciated the dangers of 
cultural conflict between sections of minority communities and Western liberal values 
and lifestyle (1992) and accordingly argues the need for a dynamic and interactive 
multiculturalism rather than one characterised by defensiveness and introspection 
(2005(b)). Thus, multiculturalism could strengthen national solidarity. He is also more 
open than Parekh to the influence of universal values although contends that these 
require mediation within different national contexts (2005(a): Chapter 9).   
 
The Human Rights Act (1998) links Britain to universal principles of justice that 
provide a foundation for social solidarity in a diverse society. The recently established 
Commission for Equality and Human Rights presents a further shift in the direction of 
universality in that it is intended to unite into a single institution the various bodies 
that currently protect against specific forms of discrimination - race, gender and 
disability – and add age and sexual orientation. The point is that any human being, not 
merely members of specific minorities, is potentially vulnerable to any of these forms 
of discrimination.  
 
The inclusion of ‘Equality’ in the title of the Commission for Equality and Human 
Rights offers some encouragement for those who consider Britain too unequal a 
society. Marxism offers a penetrating systemic critique of capitalist inequality as well 
as of nationalism but the refusal of many Marxists to link the human rights and 
equality projects smacks of the ideological rigidity of yesteryear. Unfortunately, the 
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interpretation of numerous writers of the left of the Enlightenment tradition of rights 
as primarily liberal propaganda has significantly undermined the intellectual 
credibility of the human rights movement (for instance, Wallerstein, 1991; Hall in 
Hesse, 2000, 227-31). The ‘blame game’ is dangerous in the current incendiary 
climate. The ‘wrongs’ of liberal societies and individuals must be confronted but they 
do not undermine the argument for human rights. Historically inhumanity between 
cultures has been routine: the human capacity for evil - what Freud came to refer to as 
‘the death instinct’ - appears universal. Recognition of one’s own evil – actual or 
potential – is likely to contribute more to progress than condemnation of the evil – 
real or imagined - of others.  Such modest insight may even be a precondition for an 
effective global dialogue on human rights.  
 
Equality is as much a part of the human rights tradition as liberty and solidarity. A 
rights-informed social democracy is the answer to outmoded attempts to separate 
Communist/socialist and liberal/social democratic interpretations of equality. The 
point is to combine these traditions effectively. 
 
Equality and Social Solidarity 
 
The adoption of egalitarian policies could significantly contribute to the strengthening 
of social solidarity in Britain and, for that matter, globally. Before focusing on the 
socially stabilising effects of equality it is helpful to locate the concept within the 
development of the rights tradition. Equality gains purchase through being part of a 
wider developing framework of rights.   
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The practical pursuit of equality has occurred mainly within the context of emerging 
nation states. T.H. Marshall’s account of the struggle for civil, political and social 
rights in Britain demonstrates how rights have come to be associated with national 
citizenship (Marshall, 1963, 1973). The focus of equality has shifted in given periods 
with social equality, particularly welfare being the dominant emphasis for most of the 
twentieth century. Not all individuals and groups benefited equally from the 
attainment of these rights but Marshall discerns a progressive and cumulative pattern. 
More recently, Bryan Turner has illustrated that national traditions and the legal 
embodiment of rights vary considerably (Turner, 1990). While this is true, the 
emergence of a global human rights perspective can underpin and may even 
eventually supersede national-citizens’ rights (see Soysal, 1994). Human rights have 
an inherently universal dimension - despite enormous and well-charted 
inconsistencies of practice. The justification for possession of human rights is simply 
membership of the species or common humanity rather than national citizenship. The 
universality of human rights was a prominent theme during the Enlightenment (see 
Lynd, 1982, especially Chapter 5 titled ‘My Country is the World’) and again, during 
and after the Second World War culminating in the United Nation’s Declaration of 
Human Rights.    
 
However, Bhikhu Parekh’s (2002) and Ash Amin (2004) rightly argue that the 
European (and Western) liberalism should not be the sole basis for the construction of 
global human rights. Human rights must be constructed and possessed by the species 
not merely by members of a specific culture. Amin observes that even before post-war 
immigration Europe has long been exposed to and influenced by non-European 
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philosophical and religious traditions and the conditions are there for cultural 
exchange to increase and for the fostering of a community of discussion (2004: 13-4).  
 
Despite the serious problems bedevilling the human rights project, they are 
increasingly institutionalised at the international/global level for which the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights provides a broad template and point of appeal. 
It appears that civil and political rights are emerging more widely than social rights 
(although there is a strong Islamic tradition of communal help and protection as 
distinct from state welfare). The uneven development of social equality is partly 
related to the dominance of neo-liberal capitalism which, whatever its other 
characteristics relative to the distribution of resources and opportunity, tends to 
increase the gap between the very rich and the poor. As the protests of a myriad of 
social movements claim, growing inequality is a potential threat to global stability.     
 
Referring to material inequality in Britain, particularly of wealth and income Jackson 
and Segal state: 
‘Current levels of inequality are not only unjust: they also undermine social solidarity’ 
(2004: 39). 
Social rights embrace citizens of all ethnic groups: they are colour-blind. In Britain, a 
significant improvement in the material conditions of poorer sections of particularly 
the African-Caribbean, Pakistani and Bangladeshi and white populations would 
achieve more for solidarity than further emphasis on multiculturalism. Jackson and 
Segal cite comparative studies that  ‘demonstrate that more economically equal 
societies are also those that exhibit the highest level of trust between their citizens’ 
(2004: 41). Both the civil disorders involving black youth in the 1980s and Pakistani 
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and Bangladeshi youth in 2001 were at least partly caused by low wages, high 
unemployment and an accompanying sense of disaffection (Cantle Report: 2001; see 
also, Cantle, 2004). In this important respect, the causes and solutions to Britain’s 
disorders are similar to those occurring in France in 2005. Hopefully, it is not too late 
to reclaim a significant minority of seriously disaffected British Muslim youth 
through egalitarian reform. Of course, a general reduction of social inequality would 
benefit far more white people than members of ethnic minorities although in relative 
terms the latter would benefit most. However, the wider the benefits of egalitarian 
reform the more positive should be the effect on social solidarity.   
 
In a brave article titled ‘No one asked Blackburn’s people what they wanted’, the 
veteran socialist thinker, Jeremy Seabrook, stresses the importance of including 
disadvantaged white people in egalitarian reform (Guardian, 30.12.2002). He 
combines a robust anti-racism with an understanding of the insecurities of white 
working class people in relation to immigration. He observes that the white working 
class did not formulate immigration policy but experienced its disruptive 
consequences more directly than the middle class. Similarly, Gavron and Dench 
contend that resentment at immigration among some white working class people in 
London’s East End was not racist but reflected that they had lost ground in relation to 
social services (2006).  
 
Seabrook advocates a major attack on poverty not only in Britain but also in the poor 
countries in which many members of Britain’s minorities have roots. The Marshall 
plan accomplished something on a similar scale in post-war Europe and given the 
political will, it could be done again. In Britain, some resources could be directed to 
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improving and extending public facilities and places – those spaces we share together. 
Seabrook’s suggestions seem more adequate to healing social and ethnic divisions 
than Goodhart’s which smack of what Beck might refer to as a first modernity type 
solution (i.e. nationalism) to a second modernity problem (2006: 69).     
 
It is worth reiterating that both Durkheim and Marx also considered that greater 
equality would strengthen social solidarity. Although they differed ideologically, both 
regarded inequality as socially disruptive. Whereas Durkheim addressed the issue in 
terms of the reform of capitalist society, Marx argued that long-term social stability 
and capitalism were incompatible. Durkheim argued that the division of labour 
contributed optimally to social solidarity only when equal opportunity existed. He 
considered that this was far from the case in his own time with the result that feelings 
of anomie in relation to industrial work were rife (Durkheim: 353-73). He appreciated 
that to achieve equality of opportunity would involve substantial state intervention. 
His concept of anomie resonates with Marx’s analysis of alienation in the context of 
capitalist production. Marx pitted the solidarity of the working class against 
capitalism and foresaw a future of solidarity in a classless society. He advocated the 
abolition of the capitalist division of labour but never quite stipulated what equality in 
communist society might involve. Whatever the respective merits of Durkheim’s 
radical reformism and Marx’s communism, both understood the substantial 
relationship between equality and solidarity and both in their different ways were 
more radical than many contemporary commentators, including many of the left. 
 
There is no shortage of other areas of common concern in addition to material 
equality. For, instance, the national curriculum – which some wanted to call the 
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‘common curriculum’ – should be widened to include the international and British 
history of ethnic and religious minorities. Faith schools should be required to set aside 
substantial quotas for those of other beliefs and, in turn, these beliefs should be 
embedded in the educational ethos and exchange of the schools. Areas of discussion 
between communities that might lead to policy changes include marriage, ‘the family’ 
and gender; drugs, including the international drug trade and the sale and abuse of 
alcohol; and British foreign policy in the light of its reconstituted population. These 
suggestions are made in the spirit of international humanism but some or all may 
appeal to both multiculturalists and nationalists. All the better if coming from 




The conflicts and stresses associated with Britain’s multicultural society have 
provoked a number of suggestions about how to increase integration and strengthen 
social solidarity. This issue has been widely perceived as a conflict of between 
‘British’ identity and the identities of ‘other cultures’ and/or religions. An almost 
reflex response has been to seek a revitalisation and strengthening of national 
symbols, values and bonds i.e., of national culture. As even many supporters of this 
approach acknowledge, the difficulty is that there is widespread disagreement about 
what ‘Britishness’ is and what aspects, if any, should be generally identified with. 
Your idealised Britain may very well not be mine. It matters that Britons care about 
their country but the basis of caring need not be in a revived and perhaps artificially 
gerrymandered nationalism. Given the cultural diversity of Britain, shared material 
self-interest in the form of rights and greater material equality is a sounder basis for 
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social solidarity. Certainly, some rights will be coded and secured nationally but 
globalisation means that the most convincing justification for and in part the delivery 
of rights lays beyond national borders. Many, though not all, rights are supported at 
all of the ethnic communal, national and global level and in practice there is often 
more practical agreement than theoretical argument might suggest. However, the 
imperatives of historical change, particularly growing global interdependence, and the 
need for a longer vision require the articulation of these matters in the most inclusive 
and unifying terms. 
 
Britain is not alone in facing the consequences of imperial expansion. The former 
European colonial powers are all confronting a late post-imperial crisis. What is 
needed is a post-imperial humanistic global vision and matching action on a scale to 
convince the understandably sceptical. It really does not matter whether this is termed 
radical, liberal, Marxist or, for that matter Islamic. It needs to be agreed and it 




1.At the poles of opinion this debate can be quite uncompromising and emotive. Thus, 
Gilles Kepel’s piece, Why multiculturalism has failed in Britain, ran the sub-heading 
‘Society has a choice between two models: radical secularism and radical 
multiculturalism’ and he left no doubt which he preferred (Independent, 22.08.2005: 
29). In contrast, Jonathan Steele’s article in the Guardian was as critical of British 
national history as its title indicates: The textbook whitewash of our brutal empire is a 
lie (20.01.2006: 31).  
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2.The following pieces make the point although none was an explicit attack on 
political correctness: Abbott, D. ‘It hurts me to say it, but guns really are a black 
issue’ in Evening Standard, 21.09.05; Phillips, T. ‘Running faster into the same brick 
wall’ in Guardian, 01.06.2005; Alibhai-Brown, Y. ‘Black racism is every bit as bad 
as white racism’ in The Independent,03.02.2003.  Later Alibhai-Brown gave a 
qualified but vigorous defence of political correctness in a notable spat with the right-
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